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Abstract
Thispaper attempts to connect two rather different fields of study by applying 
concepts from regulating technological risks to the field of cyberspace 
regulation. The concept of framing assumption is used in order to show the 
cyberspace regulation differences in  countries particularly between the U.S. and 
the Euopean system. It shows how the U.S. and Europe have adopted different 
assumptions regarding the policy problem, the system within which the problem 
arises and the policy solutions. While the problem for the U.S. regulatory system 
is technological advancement, the European countries perceived the problem 
as mitigating hazards. The system for the U.S. is conceived as the competition 
among profit-seeking companies, where as European countries are suspicious 
about those profit-seeking activities. Finally, the solution is lower government 
intervention for the former, and the latter found the direct involvement of the 
government as the main solution. An important implication is that there is no 
unified form of regulation and countries like Iran need to consider their local 
factors in order to establish their own regulatory systems. 
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Introduction 
The rapid development of the world after the industrial revolution in 
1770 has been analysed by several scholars during the past 250 years. 
A well-known picture of this history has divided it into 5 technological 
revolutions (Freeman & Perez, 1988; Freeman & Louca, 2001) or 
somehow three industrial revolutions that is now breeding thefourthone, 
which is called industry 4 (Kagermann et al., 2013).
The mechanization of textile machinery followed by advances 
in steam engine led to the development of railway industry has been 
counted as two successive technological revolutions (Perez, 2010) that 
are also integrated as the first industrial revolution (von Tunzelmann, 
1978). Electrical motors and internal combustion engines; then, changed 
the world from the mid-18th century to the late 19th century as the third 
and the fourth technological revolutions (Perez, 2010), or the second 
industrial revolution. Finally, the ICT internet and other communication 
practices, initiatedby the development of microprocessors, paved the 
way for the fifth technological or the third industrial revolution (Perez, 
2010). 
There is no doubt that the impacts of technological changes in 
the society are unexpected and somehow far beyond the control of 
any agents, let alone the government (Jasanoff, 2005). Although it 
was initially developed as part of networking projects in the military 
services of the USA by ARPA organization (Lloyd, 2000); the internet 
is now transformed as an indispensable part of human life. This raises 
serious concerns over the regulation of cyberspace and different 
approacheshave been developed for this purpose (Trotter Hardy, 1994; 
Barlow, 1996; Johnson & Post, 1996; Boyle, 1997; Lessig, 1999; 2000).
Jurisdictions have also adopted different approaches for regulating 
the cyberspace. A clear distinction appears between the U.S. with a 
liberal regime of regulation and Europe, which concerns more about 
the content and application of the cyberspace (Ameli, 2018). Some 
countries like Cuba and Russia havetried to pose serious restrictions 
over the internet while some East Asian countries preferred to follow 
the suggestions of international organizations (Ameli, 2018). 
More recently, new technologies such as nano-, bio-, and cognitive 
technologies have emerged that in turn increased the human power 
to change the world according to its interests and somehow desires 
(Maynard & Mehrtens, 1993). Their combination with information 
technologies is called converging technologies that could enhance 
human authority over nature (Roco & Bainbridge, 1998). With huge 
impacts of those technologies on human life, some scholars developed 
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the concept of the risk society (Beck,1992), pointing to the fact that our 
everyday lives in one or some ways deal with how to confront those 
risks (Jasanoff, 1986). 
This paper tries to shed some light on approachesof cyberspace 
regulation from the works pertaining to the regulation of other new 
technologies discussed above. Therefore, the views towards cyberspace 
regulation will be elaborated briefly first. Then, the approaches towards 
regulating other technologies will be presented. Finally, the lessons and 
implications will be discussed. 
Cyberspace regulation approaches
Perspectives about cyberspace regulation are inherently concerned 
about the differences between the actual and the digital world by asking 
“what” questions about the regulation. The former concerns different 
forms of regulation while the latter concentrates on the legitimacy of 
the controller. 
Libertarians emphasize independence (Barlow, 1996), or self-
governance features of cyberspace (Johnson & Post, 1996). Those views 
normally criticize the concepts of the actual or authentic world, the 
jurisdictional views of regulation, and effectiveness of international 
institutions or agreements. Instead, they suggest the most self-governing 
and decentralized forms of regulationbased on just regulating on Domain 
names (Trotter Hardy, 1994). It is not surprising to see that those views 
are normally hosted in the context of the U.S. as a country traditionally 
embraces the liberal views towards technological advancements 
(Jasanoff, 2005). 
On the other hand, there are scholars with more realistic views, 
including Lawrence Lessig and James Boyle. Lessig’s arguments are 
best known as hisanswer to the question of what regulates points to 
four interrelated and possible constraints in the cyberspace (1999; 
2000): 
- Law: directly regulate the cyberspace and indirectly affects the 
three following regulators.
- Markets: constrain works by price mechanisms that in turn may 
affect the norms. 
- Norms: normally the result of self-regulation activities within the 
World Wide Web. 
- Code: similar to the “built environment” in physical space (e.g. 
locks, doors, guns, etc.), codes can control access and monitor 
the behaviours through identifying what actions are possible and 
what are impossible.
Ebrahim Souzanchi Kashani
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Figure 1. Lessig’s four constrain over cyberspace
Finally, the regulation of the cyberspace needs to find the best 
combination of those constraints in order to achieve the desired results. 
The trend of legislation of the cyberspace also shows a shift from liberal 
approaches to recognizing more legitimacy of the local governments to 
regulate the cyberspace. It means the convergence does not exist anymore 
(such as contentions over regulations in NETmundial Initiative in 2014) 
as each country seeks jurisdictional power in order to set its owns rules 
and restrictions over the cyberspace. However, the proper roles of nation-
states are remained unsolved (Marchanet & Robertson, 2015).
Regulating technological risks
A primary challenge for both the public and the policymakers in the 
current era is finding credible ways of dealing with technological risks 
because of the advent of unprecedented powers of new technologies 
(Jasanoff, 1986). On this basis, several theoretical and empirical studies 
have been undertaken since the last three decades. Löfstedt and Frewer 
(1998: x) in their edition that collected some eminent studies about risk 
noted, “It is a research area that has grown very rapidly over the last 
seven years … since then, three new major risk journals … have been 
launched, and various organizations … have been established.” 
As a result of this new attention, the concept of risk has also shifted 
from a quantitative and reducible thing into a more broadly subjective 
element that instead of ‘estimation’ and ‘analysis’, recalls more 
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‘communication’ and ‘management’ (Stirling, 1998). The underlying 
knowledge of regulating risk in the former notion is expert knowledge, 
able to estimate the likelihood of the well-known outcomes (van 
Zwanenberg & Millstone, 2005); while the latter needs other types of 
knowledge for decision making (Millstone, 2009). Weinberg (1972: 211) 
in a critical paper introduced the concept of trans-science, indicating the 
“questions of the fact and can be stated in the language of science, they 
are unanswerable by science; they transcend science.”
The incertitude matrix developed by Stirling (1998) demonstrated 
different conditions. The top-left hand side is called risk as to the classical 
situation in which the formal, mathematical and instrumental views 
are the basis for decision-making. Uncertainty, left bottom, refers to the 
situation in which there is no basis for probability analysis, while the set 
of outcomes are identified. Moving to the right hand, ambiguity points to 
the circumstances in which there is no agreement around the possible 
outcomes, as a matter of subjective disagreements. Finally, ignorance is a 
situation in which we do not know what we do not know (Stirling, 2003).
Table 1.  Dimensions of incertitude from Stirling (2003)
Wynne (1992) pointed to a crucial, but often overlooked, aspect of his 
analysis of the Windscale inquiry (i.e. Wynne, 1983) that official experts 
framed the issue upon some prior socio-institutional assumptions. 
Thereafter, subsequent studies of regulating risk paid attention to 
the idea of framing assumptions that frame the views of the experts, 
protagonists or policy makers that might operate at different levels. For 
instance, Jasanoff (1990) highlighted three cultures of regulation as the 
social framing of regulation that makes a distinction between regulatory 
regimes of the USA, the UK, and Germany and then provided more 
evidence for this view in her later book (Jasanoff, 2005).
The concept of framing is developed into public policy analysis in the 
early 1990s. Frames, as the underlying structure of belief, largely define 
the interests of the protagonists and determine their policy positions and 
     Knowledge about outcomes     Outcomes are well-defined Outcomes purely defined Knowledge about  possibilities 
Firm basis for possibilities Risk Ambiguity No basis for possibilities  Uncertainty Ignorance                                 
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even their understandings of the policy problem (Schon & Rein, 1994). 
Thus, having two different sets of frames could lead to two different 
understandings of the policy problem, policy situation renders that problem 
and even policy solutions (Souzanchi Kashani & Millstone 2013; 2016). 
Sociologists like Jasanoff (2005) argued that the national cultures 
are pivotal in shaping the framings of each country by coining the 
concept of civic epistemology referring to the institutional practices by 
which members of a society test and deploy knowledge as a basis for 
their collective choices (decisions).
Applying risk concepts to cyberspace regulation
The analyses of the differences between jurisdictions in regulating 
technological risks have been conducted using the above frameworks. 
From the risk perspective, as Stirling matrix shows, the U.S. normally 
tends to framenew emerging technologies such as biotechnologyin the 
“Risk” cell presuming that not only the outcomes are well known, but also 
the likelihoods could be measured using several scientific tools. On the 
other hand, Europe framed the situation as ignorance, presuming that 
not only the possibilities are not well known, but also there is no basis 
for measuring their likelihoods. The regulation paradigm of Europe is 
called the precautionary approach stressing the prior risk assessments 
before any product release to the market (Levidow et al., 2005). 
This is because they have framed the policy problem, the situation and 
the solutions differently (Souzanchi Kashani, 2011). In the U.S., the real 
problem is framed as technological advancement rather than technological 
risks, which is the primary concernof Europe (Souzanchi Kashani, 2008). 
This approach to technological risk is now being applied to the context 
of cyberspace (Siboni & Sivan-Sevilla, 2017). They point that “while the 
United States believes that business interests will lead companies to 
defend themselves, the European Union takes a more interventionist 
approach in which state institution makes sure to defend the various 
sectors for the good of the citizens” (Siboni & Sivan-Sevilla, 2017: 90). 
As a result, the U.S. delegates the responsibility of risk prevention to the 
private sectors while Europe applies both prevention and mitigation of 
risks based on its direct interventions. Finally, Israel is deemed to show 
a mixed model between the two extremes, using no regulation for the 
civic sector but applying statism approach for the private companies. 
Conclusion
Regulating new technologies have been the subject of several studies in 
the past 4 decades. However, some areas like biotechnology havebenefited 
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more from academic works concentrating on technological risks, while 
others such as nanotechnology or cyberspace have not been analysed 
much from this point of view. In this paper, we applied the concepts of 
technological risk in the context of cyberspace in order to understand 
the differences between the U.S. and Europe. One recent study has also 
applied asimilar approach, although in a less analytical format (i.e. 
Siboni & Sivan-Sevilla, 2017). 
What this paper could add to their picture is to portray the differences 
between the two continents considering the framework perspective. Our 
framework suggests that the differences between those jurisdictions 
stem from two rather different views towards the policy problem, the 
policy system, and the solutions. The following table tries to capture the 
distinctions (Table 2).
Table 2. Differences among framing assumptions of the U.S. and Europe
    U.S. Europe The policy problem Technological advancement Mitigating technological hazards Assumptions Cyberspace is similar to other technologies (such as automobile) Cyberspace is different from ordinary technologies  
The system A competitive market mechanism constituted from profit-seeking companies aimed to promote technologies 
A competitive market mechanism within which, profit-seeking activities may harm the civil society 
Assumptions Business agents are trustable and consider their social responsibilities 
Business agents are not trustable as they may generate hazards  
The policy solutions Government with the lowest intervention in risk management 
State should directly involve in risk assessment and management 
Assumptions The impact of hazardsare not irreversible, therefore, could be managed via price mechanisms 
The impacts of risks are so serious that the main obligation of the government has to mitigate the risks  
Ebrahim Souzanchi Kashani
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If Iran wants to accept a uniform regulatory regime regarding the 
cyberspace, itneeds to start firstly from its assumption in the three categories 
mentioned above. First of all, assumptions about the policy problem. It is 
essential to know why the country needs a cyberspace regulation and what 
problemit targets to solve. Secondly, it is extremely important to have a clear 
understanding ofthe system within which such problem arises. Otherwise, 
different factors would be presented, as the things need to be regulated. 
Finally, the assumptions about the solutions should be clarified in order to 
shape a homogeneous environment for regulation. 
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